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ACTION ACCRUAL DATE FOR WRITTEN
WARRANTIES TO REP AIR: DA TE OF
DELIVERY OR DATE OF FAILURE TO
REPAIR?

Written warranties are commonly offered in sales transactions,
especially those involving durable goods such as appliances, tools, and
automobiles. Such warranties frequently contain provisions in which
the seller promises to repair or replace the goods should they prove
defective within a specified period (repair provision). In an informal
survey,' approximately ninety-six percent of written warranties examined
contained a repair provision and thus were "repair warranties." In
addition, about half of the warranties examined made no promise
regarding the condition of the goods or stated that repair was the seller's
sole obligation (sole repair warranty). 2
The Uniform Commercial Code establishes the period during which
a buyer with a warranty claim must sue. Under Code section 2-725, 3

I. In this survey, 56 warranties were examined. There is no guarantee that these warranties
are representative of the full range of warranties in the market today. This group does, however,
include many warranties offered to the average consumer. Warranties from 16 product categories
were examined, including sporting goods, automobiles, watches, kitchen utensils, pens, electronic
games, shoes, calculators, small, medium, and large sized appliances, tools, cameras, lawn mowers,
typewriters, cosmetics, plumbing implements, and mattresses.
2. For example, Sears, the nation's number one retailer, see Corporate Scoreboard, Bus.
WK., March 14, 1983, at 65, 86 (1982 sales), and General Motors, the world's largest auto maker,
see How the G.M. Toyota deal buys time, Bus. WK., Feb. 28, 1983, at 32, have apparently
uniformly adopted sole repair warranties for their products. (Sears warranty information is limited
to Sears brand products.)
Other findings as to the frequency of certain warranty characteristics:
(I) Approximately 700/o (39/56) of warranties examined contained a provision promising that
the product was free from defects (no-defects provision).
(2) Approximately 170/o (6/35) of warranties containing both a no-defects provision and a
repair provision (dual warranties) contained a time limitation only in the repair provision.
(3) Approximately 570/o (32/56) of warranties examined had at least one of the two following
characteristics: (a) contained a time term only in the repair provision; (b) were sole warranties
to repair.
(4) Approximately 70% (26/37) of warranties examined contained a disclaimer of seller's responsibility for product failure due to abuse or misuse.
For formal compilations of the frequency of some warranty characteristics including, inter
alia, warranty period duration, damages exclusions, limitations on implied warranties, and limitations on transferability, see generally Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90
YALE L.J. 1297 (1981); Gerner & Bryant, Appliance Warranties as a Market Signal?, 15 J. CONSUMER AFF. 75 (1981); Note, An Empirical Study of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 31 STAN.
L. REV. 1117 (1979).
3. The language of U.C.C. § 2-725, in relevant part, is as follows:
(I) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within four
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the limitations period for warranty actions (and for actions on contracts for the sale of goods generally) is four years. If the warranty
is a simple promise that the goods are free from defects (no-defects
warranty), this four-year period begins on the date the goods are
delivered. The limitations period may begin at a different time, however,
if the warranty contains a repair provision, e~pecially where there is
no promise that the goods are not defective. 4
This Note argues that the statute of limitations for an action for
breach of a repair warranty should begin to run not when the goods
are delivered (on-delivery rule), but when the manufacturer has failed
to repair the goods (failure-to-repair rule). Part I considers the current
division of authority relating to the action accrual date (the date at
which the limitations period begins) for repair warranties. It analyzes
the issue of whether the repair warranty is a species of future performance warranty under section 2-725(2) and examines non-Code law
on repair promises. Part II discusses the advantages and disadvantages
of allowing the statute of limitations to begin running only after the
manufacturer has failed to repair. Part III concludes that a failure-torepair rule -best serves the purposes of the Code's rules regarding prospective warranties (those that promise performance at a future time)
and proposes an amendment to section 2-725 to this end. 5
years after the cause of action has accrued. By the original agreement the parties may
reduce the period of limitation to not less than one year but may not extend it.
(2) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved
party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender
of delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to the future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered.
4. Typical of a sole repair warranty might be this provision:
For one year from date of purchase, when this Air Conditioner is operated and maintained for normal room cooling according to owner's instructions attached to or furnished with the product, [Manufacturer] will repair this Air Conditioner free of charge,
if defective in material or workmanship.
A dual warranty promising both that the product was not defective and that it would be repaired
if it were found to be defective might be as follows:
All parts of the [Manufacturer's] faucet are warranted to the original consumer purchaser to be free from defects in material and workmanship for a period of five years
from the date of purchase. [Manufacturer] will replace, free of charge, during the warranty period, any part which proves defective in material and/or workmanship under
normal installation, use, and service. THIS WARRANTY IS LIMITED TO DEFECTIVE PARTS REPLACEMENT ONLY. LABOR CHARGES AND/OR DAMAGE
INCURRED IN INSTALLATION, REPAIR, OR REPLACEMENT AS WELL AS
INCIDENT AL AND CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES CONNECTED THEREWITH
ARE EXCLUDED. Any damage to this faucet as a result of misuse, abuse, neglect,
accident, improper installation, or any use violative of instructions furnished by us,
WILL VOID THE WARRANTY.
5. This analysis does not consider the action accrual date for implied warranties. In almost
all cases involving implied warranties the action is held to accrue at the date of delivery. See,
e.g., Clark v. De Laval Separator Corp, 639 F.2d 1320, 1325 (5th Cir. 1981); Holdridge v. Heyer-
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THE CURRENT CONFUSION REGARDING THE ACTION ACCRUAL DATE
FOR BREACH OF A REPAIR WARRANTY

Courts applying the Uniform Commercial Code and courts looking
beyond Code language have addressed the issue of when the statute
of limitations should begin to run on an action for breach of a repair
warranty. Cases applying the Code language generally construe a repair
provision as a limitation of remedies for breach of warranty but fail
to address adequately the question of when, given such a construction, the limitations period should begin. Courts not applying Code
language have concluded that breach of a repair warranty occurs only
upon the seller's failure to repair and therefore that the statute can
begin running only at this point.

A.

The Uniform Commercial Code's Answer

The general rule of section 2-725(2) is that an action for breach of
warranty accrues on the date of delivery. 6 Under the same subsection,
however, the general rule does not apply where a warranty explicitly
extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach
must await such performance. 7 In such cases, the action accrues when
Schulte Corp., 440 F. Supp. 1088, 1103 (N.D.N.Y. 1977) (and cases cited therein); J. WHITE
& R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 419 n.73 (2d ed.
1980); Annot., 93 A.L.R.3D 690, 692-96 (1979 & Supp. 1983). Moreover, in almost all of the
decisions considered here, the parties had contracted for the sale of goods. Contracts for services
may be denied Code treatment. See H. Hirschfield Sons Co. v. Colt Indus., 107 Mich. App.
720, 724-27, 309 N.W.2d 714, 716-17 (1981); Lincoln Pulp & Paper Co. v. Dravo Corp., 436
F. Supp. 262, 275 (D. Maine 1977) (and authorities cited). Thus, if a manufacturer's repair obligation/agreement were viewed as a separate services contract, the Code might be inapplicable. Where
services are incidental to the sale of goods, however, U .C.C. § 2-725(2) is applicable. See TeleRadio Sys. Ltd. v. De Forest Elecs., Inc., 92 F.R.D. 371, 374 (D.N.J. 1981) (citiPg Triangle
Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737, 742 (2d Cir. 1979)); see also Shapiro v.
Long Island Lighting Co., 71 A.D.2d 671, 418 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1979). Because a contract for
the sale of goods is involved here, the U.C.C. is applicable. Hence, regardless of what the action
accrual date is determined to be, the rule in U.C.C. § 2-725(1), quoted supra note 3, that actions
for breach of contract for the sale of goods must be commenced within four years of the action
accrual date is applicable.
6. See supra note 3.
7. Id. Two commentators have undertaken to analyze judicial treatment (to 1974) of the
§ 2-725(2) future performance exception with respect to a broad range of arguably prospective
warranties, including warranties as to the quality of goods and warranties of title, and have
advocated radical changes in the language and sweep of the exception. See Schmitt & Hanko,
For Whom the Bell Tolls-An Interpretation of the U.C. C. 's Exception as to Accrual of a Cause
of Action for Future Performance Warranties, 28 ARK.
REV. 311 (1974). The analytical focus
of this Note is much narrower, reaching only warranties that contain repair provisions. In particular, this Note examines the critical issue of construction of the repair provision as a remedy
limitation that cannot receive the benefit of the Code's general rule or exception for warranties.
This construction is unique to the repair provision and therefore is left entirely unexamined by
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the breach is or reasonably should have been discovered. 8
1. Repair Warranties as Remedy Limitations Incapable of Extending to Future Performance- Because product repair promises are
warranties 9 - or are at least labeled as such 10 - application of section 2-725 to repair warranties is facially appropriate. Thus, such warranties may be subject to the section 2-725 action accrual date rules.
Moreover, repair promises with specific duration terms are arguably
explicit extensions to future performance, and, as such, the statute of
limitations may begin to run only after discovery of the breach. 11
the above described work. Moreover, the "Proposal for Revised § 2-725" offered by Schmitt
& Hanko, given the prevailing construction of repair provisions as remedies, would not allow
such provisions prospective treatment. See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
8. See supra note 3. Doubtless the issue of when a breach of a repair obligation is "discovered"
would often arise if the statute of limitations for such an obligation were held to run at a point
later than delivery. Section 2-725(2) requires that where such a warranty explicitly extends to
future performance and discovery must await such performance, the action accrues at the date
at which the breach is or reasonably should have been discovered. The reasonable opportunity
for early discovery has been found to be important on several occasions. See, e.g., Holdridge
v. Heyer-Schulte Corp., 440 F. Supp. 1088, 1101 (N.D.N.Y. 1977); Gemini Typographers v.
Mergenthaler Linotype Co., 48 A.D.2d 637,638, 368 N.Y.S.2d 210, 212 (1975); see also Voth
v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 218 Kan. 644, 648-49, 545 P.2d 371, 376 (1976); Rochester Welding
Supply Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 78 A.D.2d 983, 984, 433 N. Y.S.2d 888, 889-90 (I 980) (Doerr,
J., dissenting). When the manufacturer's only obligation is to repair or replace, a reasonable
interpretation is that discovery occurs when the manufacturer has clearly failed or refused to
repair. This interpretation is consistent with the common law rule that breach of a conditional
contract can occur only upon the occurrence of the condition. See infra note 91.
9. See Owens v. Patent Scaffolding Co., 77 Misc. 2d 992, 998, 354 N.Y.S.2d 778, 784, 14
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 610, 617 (1974) ("a promise to repair is an express warranty
that the promise to repair will be honored"), rev'd on other grounds, 50 A.D.2d 866, 376 N. Y.S.2d
948 (1975); Standard Alliance Indus. v. Black Clawson Co., 587 F.2d 813, 821 n.17 (6th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979).
10. A court may well find that a repair provision is not a warranty at all. See infra notes
18-33 and accompanying text.
I I. In practice, the explicit extension standard has been difficult to meet. Because § 2-725(2)
requires that warranties explicitly extend to future performance of the goods to be excepted from
the on-delivery rule, courts have ruled that "there must be a specific reference to a future time
in the warranty. As a result of this harsh construction, most express warranties cannot meet
the test." Standard Alliance Indus. v. Black Clawson Co., 587 F.2d 813, 820 (6th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979); accord Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Central Eng'g & Equip.
Co., 61 I P .2d 863, 870-71 (Wyo. 1980); see also R.W. Murray Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp.,
697 F.2d 818,823 (8th Cir. 1983); Voth v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 218 Kan. 644, 651, 545 P.2d
371, 377 (1976); Centennial Ins. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 74 Mich. App. 169, 172,253 N.W.2d
696, 697 (1977). In some cases, however, provisions not stating a general time at which future
performance will occur have qualified as explicit extensions. See generally Annot., 93 A.L.R.3o
690 (1979); Schmitt & Hanko, supra note 7. Nevertheless, it has been very clear in many cases
that the manufacturer's performance would occur in the future. See Rempe v. General Elec.
Co., 28 Conn. Supp. 160, 254 A.2d 577 (1969); U.S. Indus. v. Mitchell, 148 Ga. App. 770,
252 S.E.2d 672 (1980); Rochester Welding Supply Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 78 A.D.2d 983,
433 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1980); Mittasch v. Seal Lock Burial Vault, Inc., 42 A.D.2d 573,344 N.Y.S.2d
IOI (1973); Perry v. Augustine, 37 Pa. D. & C.2d 416, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 735
(Mercer County Ct. C.P. 1965); see also infra text accompanying notes 39-54.
Warranties providing merely that a product would function as intended have generally been
found insufficiently explicit. See Standard Alliance Indus. v. Black Clawson Co., 587 F.2d 813,
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Nevertheless, several courts have concluded that repair warranties
do not explicitly extend to future performance of the goods under Code
section 2-725(2) so that the statute of limitations begins to run at
delivery. 12 In fact, the Wyoming Supreme Court concluded that the
"weight of authority" was such that a warranty to repair should not
be found to explicitly extend to future performance under section
2-725(2). 13 In the view of these courts, the section 2-725(2) exception
applies only in situations where future performance of the product is
promised. 14 The exception applies, by its terms, only "where a war819-20 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979); Holdridge v. Heyer-Schulte Corp.,
440 F. Supp. l088, 1!03 (N.D.N.Y. 1977); Nassau Roofing and Sheet Metal Co., Inc. v. Celotex
Corp., 74 A.D.2d 679,681,424 N.Y.S.2d 786, 788 (1980). Even more detailed warranties specifying
precisely what sort of performance can be expected of a product have not been found sufficiently explicit. See Raymond-Dravo-Langenfelder v. Microdot, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 614, 618 (D. Del.
1977); Binkley Co. v. Teledyne Mid-Am. Corp., 333 F. Supp. 1183, 1186-87 (E.D. Mo. 1971),
aff'd, 460 F.2d 276 (8th Cir. 1972); see also Homan Dev. Co. v. Graybar Elec. Co., 63 A.D.2d
727, 405 N. Y .S.2d 3 IO (I 978). Some courts holding arguably prospective warranties to be merely
present in nature have held that such warranties "constitute a representation of the product's
condition at the time of delivery and do not make any reference to future time." See Holdridge
v. Heyer-Schulte Corp., 440 F. Supp. !088, 1!03-04 (N.D.N.Y. 1977); Thalrose v. General Motors
Corp., 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1257, 1258 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971); see also Citizens Util.
Co. v. American Locomotive Co., 11 N.Y.2d 418, 184 N.E.2d 171, 230 N.Y.S.2d 194 (1962).
A promise that a product is "capable" of a given performance, however, is essentially an indication of the condition of the product at the time of delivery. See Homart Dev. Co. v. Graybar
Elec. Co., 63 A.D.2d 727, 405 N.Y.S.2d 310 (1978). By contrast, the repair promise does not
relate to the present condition of the goods. Thus, reliance on this line of authority is misplaced
where a repair warranty is involved.
12. See Hansen v. F.M.C. Corp., 32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 828, 833 (D. Kan. 1981);
Voth v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 218 Kan. 644, 651-52, 545 P.2d _371, 378 (1976); Centennial
Ins. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 74 Mich. App. 169, 171, 253 N.W.2d 696, 697 (1977); Commissioners of Fire Dist. No. 9, Iselin, Woodbridge, N.J. v. American La France, 176 N.J. Super.
566, 573, 424 A.2d 441, 445 (1980); Owens v. Patent Scaffolding Co., 77 Misc. 2d 992, 999,
354 N.Y.S.2d 778, 785, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 610, 617 (1974), rev'd, 50 A.D.2d
866, 376 N. Y .S.2d 948 (1975) (six-year tort statute rather than Code's four-year sales-contract
statute applicable); Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Central Eng'g & Equip. Co., 61 I P .2d 863,
871 (Wyo. 1980); see also Benco Plastics, Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 387 F. Supp. 772,
781 & n.13, 784 (E.D. Tenn. 1974).
Although some of these decisions concern suits for personal injuries allegedly sustained as
a result of product defects (and therefore may be reasonable in finding that a repair obligation
cannot be the basis of a personal injury claim), these courts' analysis of the § 2-725(2) future
performance issue may influence other courts deciding cases involving solely economic loss. But
see Voth, 218 Kan. at 647, 545 P.2d at 374-75 (defects warranty present); Hansen, 32 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. at 832 (same). For example, Owens v. Patent Scaffolding Co. has been cited relatively
often in such cases. See R.W. Murray·Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 529 F. Supp. 297, 299
(E.D. Mo. 1981), rev'd, 697 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1983); Shapiro v. Long Island Lighting Co.,
71 A.D.2d 671,671,418 N.Y.S.2d 948,950 (1979); Commissioners of Fire Dist. No. 9, Iselin,
Woodbridge, N.J. v. American La France, 176 N.J. Super. 566,573,424 A.2d 441,445 (1980).
13. See Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Central Eng'g and Equip. Co., 61 I P.2d 863, 871
& n.9 (Wyo. 1980). The court addressed the future performance issue after it found that the
issue of whether the warranty period should have been tolled during repairs, cf. infra note 98,
was "tie[d) into (and) intimately related to the concept that the warranty is one of future performance." Id. at 871.
14. See Hansen v. F.M.C. Corp., 32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 828, 833 (D. Kan. 1981);
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ranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods." 15 A repair
provision promises repair of the goods should they prove defective,
not performance of the goods themselves. 16 Thus, under this analysis,
the section 2-725(2) future performance exception is inapplicable to
repair warranties. 11
Because classifying a warranty as a promise of future performance
of the goods brings it within section 2-725(2)'s exception to the delivery
Voth v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 218 Kan. 644, 651-52, 545 P.2d 371, 378 (1976); Centennial
Ins. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 74 Mich. App. 169, 171, 253 N.W.2d 696, 697 (1977); Commissioners of Fire Dist. No. 9, lselin, Woodbridge, N.J. v. American La France, 176 N.J. Super.
566, 573, 424 A.2d 441, 445 (1980); Owens v. Patent· Scaffolding Co., 77 Misc. 2d 992, 999,
354 N.Y.S.2d 778, 785, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 610,617 (1974), rev'd on other grounds,
50 A.D.2d 866, 376 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1975) (six-year tort statute rather than Code's four-year salescontract statute applies); Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Central Eng'g & Equip. Co., 61 I P.2d
863, 871 (Wyo. 1980); see also Grand Island School Dist. No. 2 v. Celotex Corp., 203 Neb. 559, 568,
279 N.W.2d 603, 609 (1979); Shapiro v. Long Island Lighting Co., 71 A.D.2d 671, 671, 418
N.Y.S.2d 948,950 (1979); cf. Brauer v. Republic Steel Corp., 460 F.2d 801,803 (10th Cir. 1972)
(pre-U .C.C. law substantially in accordance with § 2-725(2); "durability" warranted); Holdridge
v. Heyer-Schulte Corp., 440 F. Supp. 1088, 1 JOI (N.D.N.Y. 1977) (pre-Code law in accord with
U .C.C. § 2-725(2); both "present" and "prospective" warranties relate to "state" or "condition" of goods); Matlack, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 972,975 (E.D. Pa. 1966) ("performance of the engines"); Wilson v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 21 Ill. App. 3d 867, 872, 315 N.E.2d
580, 584 (1974) (§ 2-725(2) exception required explicit warranty as to "performance of the tractor" in question); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 92 Ill. App. 3d 136, 153-54, 414
N.E.2d 1302, 1315-16 (1980) (following Wilson; performance of "product"), rev'd on other
grounds, 91 III. 2d 69,435 N.E.2d 443 (1982); Herbstman v. Eastman Kodak Co., 68 N.J. I,
12, 342 A.2d 181, 186-87 (1975) (non-U.C.C. law; warranty as to future "condition" must be
explicit; repair warranty distinguished).
15. U.C.C. § 2-725 (quoted supra note 3) (emphasis added). The exception also requires that
"discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance." Id. This language similarly
suggests that the Code drafters contemplated warranties that promised product performance beginning at the date of delivery, the breach of which promise was merely not apparent at delivery.
See also infra note 112 and accompanying text.
16. Often a court will construe a warranty containing both a repair provision and a no-defects
provision, one or both of which contain a time term, see supra note 11; see also infra notes
23 & 61, as not promising performance of the goods and therefore as nonprospective under
U.C.C. § 2-725(2). See generally supra note 14.
17. Nonetheless, it is arguable that repair warranties do relate to performance of the goods
and therefore can qualify as an explicit extension under subsection two of U.C.C. § 2-725. Although
such warranties do not state that the goods will perform without defect, they do, in effect, ensure the performance of the goods by obligating the manufacturer to repair the goods when
any defect manifests itself. See Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp., 635 F.2d
I 08 I, I 085 (3d Cir. 1980) (purpose of repair remedy is to give buyer goods that conform to
the contract); accord Beal v. General Motors Corp., 354 F. Supp. 423, 426 (D. Del. 1973); see
also Rochester Welding Supply Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 78 A.D.2d 983, 984, 433 N.Y.S.2d
888, 889 (1980) (where contract provided that "sole remedy" in event of defect was "correction
of defect" by seller, contract explicitly extended to future performance under U.C.C. § 2-725(2)
in that contract extended "to the future successful programming" that the parties agreed the
defendant would have); Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imports, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349, 356 (Minn. 1977)
("repair and replacement clause provides . . . a remedy to the buyer, whereby he may secure
goods conforming to the contract ... "). Because the Code is to be "liberally construed and
applied to promote its underlying policies and purposes," U.C.C. § 1-102(1), a court might validly
effect the policy of§ 2-725, see infra text accompanying note 94, by construing a repair provision as a "future performance" warranty.
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rule, other classifications tend to accompany a finding that the exception is inapplicable and that the warranty in question is subject to the
on-delivery rule. Courts concluding that repair warranties do not satisfy
the "goods" requirement of the section 2-725(2) exception typically
find that repair provisions are remedy limitations. 18 This is not to say
that finding a repair provision to be a remedy limitation is, in itself,
unreasonable 19 under the Code. In fact, two Code provisions provide
18. This seems to be the approach taken by the majority of courts considering the issue.
A clear majority of courts subscribe to the view that repair warranties do not promise performance of the goods under U.C.C. § 2-725(2). See supra note 14 and accompanying text. While,
of this group, only Centennial Ins. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 74 Mich. App. 169, 171,253 N.W.2d
696, 697 (1977), and Commissioners of Fire Dist. No. 9, lselin, Woodbridge, N.J. v. American
La France, 176 N.J. Super. 566,573,424 A.2d 441,445 (1980), have explicitly identified repair
provisions as remedy limitations, see infra text accompanying notes 24 & 28, most of the other
decisions that find the warranty to be breached at delivery describe the manufacturer's obligation as something triggered only when the goods fail. See, e.g., Hansen v. F.M.C. Corp., 32
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 828, 833 (D. Kan. 1981); Voth v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 218
Kan. 644, 651-52, 545 P.2d 371, 375, 378 (1976); Owens v. Patent Scaffolding Co., 77 Misc.
2d 992, 999, 354 N.Y.S.2d 778, 785, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 610, 617 (1974), rev'd
on other grounds, 50 A.D.2d 866, 376 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1975); Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Central Eng'g & Equip. Co., 611 P.2d 863, 871 (Wyo. 1980); see also Standard Alliance Indus.
v. Black Clawson Co., 587 F.2d 813,821 n.17 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979),
(finding that Voth had adopted a remedy approach). That is, most courts denying repair warranties prospective treatment have implicitly identified the repair provision as a "mere" remedy
limitation. See also infra note 51. By contrast, few courts identifying repair provisions as remedy
limitations have held that the statute begins running at any time after delivery. See infra notes
39-57 and accompanying text.
19. Identifying the repair provision as a limitation of remedies for breach of warranty makes
the most sense where there is an underlying promise that the goods are not defective. Such a
promise is the warranty while the repair provision is arguably the remedy. If the warranty contains no promise regarding defects, see, e.g., Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v .. Central Eng'g &
Equip. Co., 61 I P.2d 863, 871 (Wyo. 1980); Commissioners of Fire Dist. No. 9, Iselin, Woodbridge, N.J. v. American La France, 176 N.J. Super. 566, 572-73, 424 A.2d 441, 445 (1980);
see also supra note 4, then this approach seems less sensible. In this situation, if the repair provision is a remedy limitation, there may be no warranty. This finding has an important implication: the basis under§ 2-316(4) and§ 2-719(1)(a) for finding that a repair provision is a limitation of "remedies for breach of warranty" may be eliminated.(§ 2-719(1)(a) seems to contemplate
only warranties that promise that the goods are not defective in that it identifies the repair remedy
as a means of redressing the problem of "non-conforming goods or parts.") Moreover, where
a court finds that even a warranty containing both a promise regarding defects or product performance and a repair provision does not relate to the goods, see, e.g., Hansen v. F.M.C. Corp.,
32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 828, 833 (D. Kan. 1981); see also supra note 14 and accompanying text, a finding that a repair provision is a limitation of remedy for breach of warranty
may similarly be questioned. In both instances, as official comment two to§ 2-316 states, "[i]f
no warranty exists, there is of course no problem of limiting remedies for breach of warranty."
U.C.C. § 2-316, Off. Comm. 2; cf. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 484 (there can
be no warranty if the seller has disclaimed warranties).
Nevertheless, the Code, by suggesting limitation of remedies via repair provisions in § 2-7 I9(1 )(a),
encourages ihe courts to construe the repair warranty in this fashion. See infra note 20; cf. 15
U.S.C. § 2301(10) (1982). Moreover, even if a repair provision could not qualify as a limitation
of express warranty, it might arguably qualify as a remedy limitMion for any implied warranties
(such as warranties implied in law under the Magnuson Moss Warranty Act (see 15 U.S.C. §
2308(a) (1982)). A limitation of remedy, however, may well be found to apply only to an accompanying express warranty. See Water Works & Indus. Supply Co. v. Wilburn, 437 S.W.2d 951
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a substantial basis for identifying repair prov1s10ns as remedy
limitations. 20 Nevertheless, such a finding has meant, in all but a few
cases,2' that the on-delivery rule must be applied. 22
(Ky. App. 1968); Holloway v. General Motors Corp., 60 Mich. App. 208, 230 N.W.2d 380 (1975),
aff'd on other grounds, 399 Mich. 617, 250 N.W.2d 736 (1977), rev'd on other grounds, 403
Mich. 614,271 N.W.2d 777 (1978); National Cash Register Co. v. Adell Indus., 57 Mich. App.
413, 225 N.W.2d 785 (1975), J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 464 n.153; Annot., 2
A.L.R.4TH 576, 589 (1980 & Supp. 1983); see also Kaiser Cement & Gypsum Corp. v. AllisChalmers Mfg. Co., 35 Cal. App. 3d 948, 957-60, Ill· Cal. Rptr. 210, 216-17 (1973); Jarnot
v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422, 428, 156 A.2d 568, 571 (1959); cf. Ventura v. Ford
Motor Corp., 180 N.J. Super. 45, 61-{i2, 433 A.2d 801, 809-810 (App. Div. 1981). Where such
a remedy limitation is held to apply to implied warranties, such application should and will be
stated expressly in the warranty. See, e.g., Southwest Forest Indus. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
422 F.2d 1013, 1015 n.2, 1019 (9th Cir. 1970); Orrox Corp. v. Rexnord, Inc., 389 F. Supp.
441,442 (M.D. Ala. 1975); Schultz v. Jackson, 67 Ill. App. 3d 889,891,893,385 N.E.2d 162,
163, 165 (1979); see also U.C.C. § 2-719(1)(b); Council Bros. v. Ray Burner Co., 473 F.2d 400,
406 & n.6 (5th Cir. 1973); Wyatt Indus. v. Publiker Indus., 420 F.2d 454, 456 (5th Cir. 1969);
Hahn v. Ford Motor Co., 434 N.E.2d 943, 947 (Ind. App. 1982). Thus, where there is no such
express statement, it seems inaccurate to identify the repair provision as a remedy limitation.
20. U.C.C. § 2-316(4) provides that "[r]emedies for breach of warranty can be limited in
accordance with the provisions of this Article on liquidation of damages and on contractual
modification of remedy." Section 2-719, the Article Two provision on contractual modification
of remedy, explicitly authorizes the parties to limit the "buyer's remedies to return of the goods
and repayment of the price or to repair or replacement of nonconforming goods or parts
... " U .C.C. § 2- 7 I9(1 }(a) (emphasis added). Not surprisingly, given this Code language, many
courts (not considering the applicability of the statute of limitations) have in fact treated such
repair/replacement provisions as attempts to create exclusive remedies. See Posttape Assocs. v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 537 F.2d 751, 756 (3d Cir. 1976); Beal v. General Motors Corp., 354 F.
Supp. 423, 426 (D. Del. 1973); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Eastman Kodak Co., IO U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 53, 57 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1972); Orange Motors, Inc. v. Dade County
Dairies, Inc., 258 So.2d 319, 320, IO U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 325, 326-27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1972); Ford Motor Co. v. Mayes, 575 S.W.2d 480, 483 (Ky. App. 1978); see also Patron Aviation, Inc. v. Teledyne Indus., Inc., 154 Ga. App. 13, 16, 267 S.E.2d 274, 278 (1980); Kusens
v. Bodyguard Rustproofing Co., 23 Ohio Op. 3d 440, 440, 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
530, 531 (Ct. App. I 980); Special Project, Article Two Warranties in Commercial Transactions,
64 CORNELL L. REV. 30, 226 n.829 (1978). See generally U.C.C. Case Dig., 2719.4 (1981 & Supp.
1982); U.C.C. Case Dig. 1 2316.12(6) (1982 & Supp. 1982); U.C.C. § 2-719, IA U.L.A. 500
n.7 (1976 & Supp. 1983).
21. See infra notes 39-54 and accompanying text.
22. The identification of the repair provision as a remedy limitation may itself suggest an
answer to the question of the action accrual date. Although the Code's definition of "remedy"
is circular regarding its description of what it is that becomes available to one who possesses
a remedial right, it does make it clear that "aggrieved" parties possess such rights: " 'Remedy'
means any remedial right to which an aggrieved party is entitled with or without resort to a
tribunal." U.C.C. § 1-201(34). See also U.C.C. § 1-201(2) (aggrieved party is one entitled to
resort to a remedy); U.C.C. § 1-201(36) (" 'rights' includes remedies"). The present availability
of a remedy thus seems to indicate that the seller has already breached its obligation under the
warranty: "[O]bligations and remedies are counterparts; when the seller fails to do what he is
required to do by the contract, i.e., fails to perform his obligation, the buyer may invoke an
appropriate remedy." J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 482 n.236; see Ford Motor
Co. v. Reid, 250 Ark. 176,184,465 S.W.2d 80, 85 (1971); Lincoln Pulp & Paper Co. v. Dravo
Corp., 436 F. Supp. 262, 277 n.18 (D. Maine 1977); Casady v. Casady, 31 Utah 394, 399-400,
88 P. 32, 34 (1906) (citing POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES 463-64 (4th ed. 1904) (remedial right springs
into being as consequence of plaintiffs primary right)); see also Hahn v. Ford Motor Co., 434
N.E.2d 943, 952-53 (Ind. App. 1982) (limitation of remedy "restricts remedy available once
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Thus, in Centennial Insurance Co. v. General Electric Co., 23 the
Michigan Court of Appeals analyzed a repair provision as "a specification of remedy to which the buyer is entitled should breach be discovered
within the first year." 24 As such, the repair provision could not warrant "performance" of the goods, and was not entitled, as plaintiff
had argued, to prospective treatment (application of a later-than-delivery
action accrual date) under section 2-725(2). 25 Thus, the warranty had
been breached and the limitations period had begun on the date of
delivery. 26 The court indicated that any ambiguity concerning the proper
construction of the repair provision should be resolved in favor of a
nonprospective construction because section 2-725(2) required that a
future performance warranty be explicitly stated. 27
Another court found that a " 'conditional' warranty for a period
of one year from date of delivery involving only a remedy - i.e. repair
or replacement related to defective material or workmanship'' did not
constitute a warranty explicitly extending to future performance of the
goods. 28 As in Centennial, the court found that the remedy provision
containing the promise to repair or replace did not warrant product 29
performance and thus could not receive prospective treatment. 30
This approach, however, is unsound. If a court finds that a repair
provision is not within the terms of section 2-725(2)'s future performance exception because it does not promise performance of the goods,
a breach has been established"); Gladden v. Cadillac Motor Car Div., 83 N.J. 320, 330, 416
A.2d 394, 399 (1980) (same); J. WmTE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 472 (same). But see
Standard Alliance Indus. v. Black Clawson Co., 587 F .2d 813, 821 n.17 (6th Cir. I 978), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979). Where a repair provision is identified as a remedy, the implication
is therefore that this provision exists to redress the breach of another obligation - most likely
an underlying warranty against defects. But only where the underlying warranty (if one exists)
can, by its terms, be breached at a time after delivery may the remedial right itself accrue at
a time after delivery. See infra note 51. But see infra note 90.
23. 74 Mich. App. 169, 253 N.W.2d 696 (1977). In Centennial the court considered a warranty that promised that the product was not defective and that if defects appeared within one
year they would be corrected. Id. at 171 n.l, 253 N.W.2d at 697 n.1. The court denied the
entire warranty prospective treatment. Id. at 171-72, 253 N. W .2d at 697. The presence of a warranty of performance of the goods, however, arguably brings the Centennial warranty within
the terms of § 2-725(2)'s future performance exception. One might object that the time term
(one year) is contained in the repair provision, not the defects provision. See id. Because the
court concluded, however, that the repair provision was only a remedy limitation, id., it seems
reasonable to conclude that the time term was a statement of the no-defects warranty's effective
period.
24. Id. at 171, 253 N.W.2d at 697.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See Commissioners of Fire District No. 9 Iselin, Woodbridge, N .J. v. American La France,
176 N.J. Super. 566, 572-73, 424 A.2d 441, 445 (1980). The court did not provide an exact
quotation of the repair warranty. Id. A separate warranty against defects was held to satisfy
the § 2-725(2) exception's requirements. Id.
29. See supra text accompanying note 14.
30. 176 N.J. Super. at 573, 424 A.2d at 445.
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its analysis is incomplete. This approach assumes that section 2-725(2)'s
general rule of action accrual at "tender of delivery" 31 is applicable
because a repair provision does not warrant performance of the goods.
The on-delivery rule itself, however, applies only in situations involving breach of a "warranty," 32 which, under the Code, must also relate
to the goods. 33 If a court views a repair provision as a remedy limitation not extending to product performance rather than as a warranty,
the on-delivery rule should not apply to that 34 provision. 35 The parties
may still look to section 2-725(2)'s first sentence, which provides that
the cause of action accrues "when the breach occurs." 36 This provision is not limited to promises that relate to the goods. 37 It is clear,
31. See U.C.C. § 2-725(2).
32. Id.
33. See U.C.C. § 2-313(1), (2).
34. The general on-delivery rule would arguably apply, however, to any no-defects obligation (either implied or express) not applicable in the future, because such provisions are "warranties" under the Code. See U.C.C. §§ 2-313, 2-725. But see infra note 41 (breach of repair
obligation can be separated from that of no-defects obligation).
35. U.C.C. § 2-313's requirement that an express warranty "relate" to the goods, see U.C.C.
§ 2-313(1), (2), is arguably broader than the § 2-725(2) requirement that a warranty explicitly
extend to future performance of the goods. Thus, aside from the issue of the intended future
operation of a warranty, a provision could qualify as an express warranty and yet not be excepted from § 2-725(2)'s general rule of action accrual at delivery.
A promise to repair, however, does not satisfy the § 2-313 "relate to the goods" requirement,
which is merely a codification of the generally accepted view of warranties as promises relating
to the quality of the goods. See Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 16, 403 P.2d 145,
150, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 33, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 915, 919-20 (1965) (Traynor, C.J.);
D. EPSTEIN & J. MARTIN, BASIC UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 320 (2d ed. 1983); Note, Uniform
Commercial Code-A Limited Remedy Fails of Its Essential Purpose Only In The Case Of a
Negligent or Willful Repudiation of the Remedy, 51 TEX. L. REV. 383, 386 (1973); cf. Hahn
v. Ford Motor Co., 434 N.E.2d 943, 952-53 (Ind. App. 1982) (disclaimer or modification of
warranty eliminates quality commitment). A repair provision relates not to the goods and their
quality, but to the manufacturer and its obligation to the purchaser. See Owens v. Patent Scaffolding Co., 77 Misc. 2d 992, 999, 354 N.Y.S.2d 778, 784, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
610,617 (1974), rev'd on other grounds, 50 A.D.2d 866,376 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1975). To construe
§ 2-313 broadly enough to include repair provisions might make it meaningless: "[i]f a promise
to repair relates to the goods, then so would nearly every provision in the contract of sale."
Special Project, supra note 20, at 226. The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act concedes the distinction between a promise that "relates to the nature of the material or workmanship" and "any
undertaking . . . in connection with the sale . . . to refund, repair, replace, or take remedial
action with respect to such product" by separating these descriptions into subsections in its definition
of written warranty. See 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6)(A), (B) (1975); cf. CAL. CIVIL CoDE § 1791.2(a)(I)
(Deering 1981). In stark contrast, the Code's definition of warranty contains only "relates to
the goods" language and therefore does not reach repair provisions. See Eddy, Effects of the
Magnuson-Moss Act upon Consumer Product Warranties, 55 N.C.L. REV. 835, 853-54 (1977);
see also J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 370; Matlack, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 253
F. Supp. 972, 976 (E.D. Pa. 1976). But see supra note 17. Moreover, a court's finding that
a repair provision is a remedy limitation constitutes an implicit recognition of the fact that such
a provision is not a warranty under the Code. See Ford Motor Co. v. Reid, 250 Ark. 176, 184,
465 S.W.2d 80, 85 (1971). Thus, a repair "warranty" falls beyond the scope of both the future
performance exception and the on-delivery rule.
36. See U .C.C. § 2-725(2).
37. Id. But see infra note 112.
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however, that neither of the Code's· rules for determining when the
breach occurs - the on-delivery rule and the future performance exception - applies to repair warranties. Thus, neither of these provisions can determine the date of breach for such warranties.

2. Future Performance Exception as Applicable to Repair Warranties Despite Characterization as a Remedy Limitation- Many courts 38
have adopted the Centennial approach and have found that because
a repair provision is merely a remedy limitation it cannot promise future
product performance. Three courts, however, have found that
characterizing a repair provision as a remedy limitation does not
foreclose prospective treatment of a repair warranty under section
2-725(2).
In Standard Alliance Industries, Inc. v. Black Clawson Co., 39 the
court considered a warranty that contained both a promise that the
product was not defective and a promise that it would be repaired if
shown to be defective within one year. The court found that the nodefects provision explicitly extended to future performance and thus
that the action had accrued on this provision when plaintiff had
discovered or should have discovered the defect. 40 The court analyzed
the repair provision separately 41 and found that even though this pro38. See supra note 18.
39. 587 F.2d 813, 816-17 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979).
40. Id. at 821.
41. In Centennial Ins. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 74 Mich. App. 169,253 N.W.2d 696 (1977),
the court rejected plaintiff's alternative argument that the repair provision was a separate contract that could be breached separately from the contract of sale. Id. at 172, 253 N.W.2d at
697. Nevertheless, the Centennial holding may not apply in cases in which a sole warranty to
repair was issued. A reading of the Centennial warranty reveals that a warranty against defects
- as well as a promise to repair - was offered. Only the promise to repair, however, extended
for a one year period; the warranty against defects did not. Thus, the warranty against defects
arguably was breached upon delivery, given the "future" requirement of U.C.C. § 2-725(2).
Because the court found that the repair provision was inseparable from the warranty against
defects, id., this provision could not be given independent construction. Where there is no attached nonprospective no-defects provision, however, a repair provision might be held breached
upon failure to repair.
Moreover, for two reasons, Centennial should not be the rule for repair warranties in general,
including ones that (also) promise that the product is not defective. First, a court may find that
a repair provision may be separated from a defects provision for statute of limitations purposes.
See Standard Alliance at 821-22 nn. 17 & 22; see also Kaiser Cement & Gypsum Corp. v. AllisChalmers Mfg. Co., 35 Cal. App. 3d 948, 959, Ill Cal. Rptr. 210, 216-18 (1973); Shapiro v.
Long Island Lighting Co., 71 A.D.2d 671, 418 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1979); Krueger v. V.P. Christianson Silo Co., 206 Wis. 460, 240 N.W. 145 (1932); cf. Hollin v. Libby, McNeill and Libby, 253
Or. 8, 14, 452 P.2d 555, 558 (1969) (plaintiff has choice of awaiting second, separate breach;
limitations period for second breach begins at later point than that for first). The Code implies
separate breach/action acrual dates for a purchaser's different warranty actions by denying implied warranties prospective treatment because they are not "explicit," while giving future performance warranties a later-than-delivery breach/action accrual date. See supra notes 3 & 5;
see also Dennin v. General Motors Corp., 78 Misc. 2d 451, 452, 357 N.Y.S. 668, 671 (1974)
(even if action on express warranty barred by contractual limitation of limitations period, implied warranty claim survives limitation). As noted above, if the provisions are separated, the
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vision was a remedy limitation, 42 the action accrued upon defendant's
failure to repair, 43 not the date of delivery or even the date of discovery
of the defect. 44 Indeed, the court specifically stated that a repair provision could itself explicitly extend to future performance. 45
Similarly, in Rochester Welding Supply Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 46
the court held that a contract47 limiting the seller's remedy "in the
event of defect" to "correction of such defect" by the seller explicitly
extended to future performance and was breached when defend ant admitted "that it could not correct the defects. " 48 According to the court,
the limitations period began only after this admission. 49
In a recent case, R. W. Murray Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 50
the court found that the presence of a "limitation of remedy to replacement" did not prevent a warranty against defects from extending to
future performance under section 2-725(2). 51 The court considered two
repair provision may be given independent prospective treatment.
Second, the court's concern that the limitations period could be extended infinitely because
it could be argued that each failure to remedy a breach gave rise to a new cause of action,
74 Mich. App. at 172, 253 N.W.2d at 697, is senseless. While the purchaser may, as in Centennial, argue that the repair promise is a separate obligation breached when the seller fails to repair,
there is no later, third obligation triggered by the seller's failure to fulfill the repair obligation.
If the warranty to repair extends for a one year period, the breach can occur, at the latest,
one year after delivery of the product. Because under § 2-725(2) the statute of limitations runs
for four years, the last point at which an action for breach can be brought under a date of
failure to repair rule is the day precisely five years after delivery. But see infra note 98 (potential
tolling).
42. 587 F.2d at 818 n.10, 821 n.17. The court stated:
We see no conceptual distinction between saying that a product is warranted for one
year against defects, the remedy limited to repair or replacement and saying that, should
a breach be discovered within one year, the seller will repair or replace defective parts.
Both are warranties explicitly extending to future performance. We recognize that there
may be differences between remedies and warranties, see fn. 10, but we do not believe
that these distinctions make a difference here.
Id. at 821 n.17.
43. Defendant had unsuccessfully attempted to repair the goods. Id. at 818, 822 n.22.
44. Id. at 822. See also id. n.22.
45. Id. at 821 n.17.
46. 78 A.D.2d 983, 433 N. Y .S.2d 888 (1980).
47. A contract provision such as that considered in Rochester Welding Supply, id. at 983,
433 N.Y.S.2d at 889, qualifies as a warranty. See U.C.C. § 2-313.
48. 78 A.D.2d at 984, 433 N. Y.S.2d at 889.
49. Id. at 983-84, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 889. The court also found that a separate contract that
provided that the sale was "subject to the final approval" to the buyer's "satisfaction" explicitly
extended to future performance under U.C.C. § 2-725(2). Id. at 983-84, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 888-89.
50. 697 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1983).
51. Id. at 823. The court's explanation was that it did not "believe that the presence of
language limiting the remedy to replacement of defective materials, by itself, is determinative
of the exact nature of the warranties in question." Id. While this decision was sensible so far
as it went, it may have serious implications for other kinds of repair warranties. Where, for
example, a repair warranty is a sole warranty to repair (perhaps half of all written warranties,
see supra text accompanying note 2), see, e.g., Rochester Welding Supply Corp. v. Burroughs
Corp., 78 A.D.2d 983, 984, 433 N.Y.S.2d 888, 889 (1980), the R. W. Murray remedy construction may mean that the future performance exception cannot apply. If the repair promise is
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warranties, one that promised that the product would be free from
defects for twenty years and that if it were defective, it would be
repaired, and one that strangely seemed to promise that the product
would repair itself. 52 The lower court had held that the action was
barred by the statute of limitations because, being only "replacement
commitments," the warranties could not extend to performance of the
goods. 53 The court of appeals reversed, holding that the defendant had
alleged the existence of warranties that explicitly extended to future
performance of the goods. 54 Unlike the Standard Alliance 55 and
Rochester Welding 56 courts, the court found that the action had accrued when the defect had been or should have been discovered. 57 Apparently it did not occur to the R. W. Murray court, as it had to the
the courts in Standard Alliance and Rochester Welding, that because
the seller had promised to repair, the action should have accrued not
upon discovery of the defect, but upon discovery that the seller had
failed to repair. 58
The R. W. Murray court's interpretation is understandable, however,
in light of its construction of the repair provision as a remedy limitation that did not play a role in the determination of the action accrual
date. 59 Because the court found that the no-defects provisions themselves
extended to future performance, 60 the warranties could be given proa remedy and there is no other promise, there may be no warranty available that can "explicitly
extend," even where the repair promise is for a specified future period. Moreover, it is possible
that where, as in Centennial Ins. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 74 Mich. App. 169, 171 n.l, 253
N.W.2d 696, 697 n.l (1977), and Standard Alliance Indus. v. Black Clawson Co., 587 F.2d
813, 816-17 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979), the time term of a warranty against
defects with repair as remedy is contained only in the repair provision, the warranty might not
explicitly extend. The theory in such a case might be that (as the court held in Centennial) the
remedy provision cannot explicitly extend. The warranty against defects, which might otherwise
qualify under the § 2-725(2) exception, would contain no time provision itself, and therefore
could not warrant future performance. Thus, the division of the repair warranty into warranty
and remedy, approved by the R. W. Murray and Centennial courts, may act to sever from a
repair warranty the prospectiveness it might have if it were read as a whole. But see R. W. Murray,
697 F.2d at 823 (court cited Standard Alliance, 587 F.2d at 821 & n.17, with approval).
52. R. W. Murray, 697 F.2d at 821-22 & nn.2-3.
53. R.W. Murray Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 529 F. Supp. 297,299 (E.D. Mo. 1981),
rev'd, 697 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1983).
54. 697 F.2d at 818. This conclusion is questionable as to the first warranty the court considered. See id. at 821-22 & n.2. It is arguable that this provision is no more than a manufacturer's promise to repair. If this is the case, the court, by holding that this provision explicitly
extended to future performance, gave a sole repair promise - a remedy limitation in the view
of the court, see id. at 823 - prospective treatment.
55. See supra text accompanying note 43.
56. See supra text accompanying note 49.
57. 697 F.2d at 824.
58. The court seems to have read the language in Code § 2-725(2), "when the breach is or
should have been discovered," to mean "when the nonconformance of the goods is or should
have been discovered."
59. See R. W. Murray, 697 F.2d at 823.
60. Id. But see supra note 54.
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spective treatment without consideration of the repair provisions. 61
Nonetheless, regardless of whether a repair warranty contains a nodefects provision extending to future performance, a finding that breach
of the repair provision 62 occurs only upon failure to repair is sensible
because it looks to the terms of that provision to determine when the
purchaser may initiate an action against the manufacturer. 63

B.

The Need to Look Outside the Code

Characterizing a repair provision as a remedy limitation should not
alter the law relating to when the purchaser may enforce a right to
repair. 64 This is apparently what motivated the Sixth Circuit in Standard Alliance65 to decide that regardless of characterization - remedy
or warranty - a repair provision explicitly extended to future performance under section 2-725(2). 66
The Standard Alliance approach, however, is not without problems.
Although this approach produces a sound result, it ignores the "goods"
language of the Code's exception for future performance warranties. 67

61. Importantly, in R. W. Murray, at least one of the warranties contained a promise that
the product would perform for a specific period of time. 697 F.2d at 822 n.3. Thus, this promise
cou ld explicitly extend to future performance. See supra note 11. In Standard Alliance Indus.
v. Black Clawson Co., 587 F.2d 813, 816-17 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979),
however, only the repair provision contained a time term. Ironically, the Standard Alliance court
also construed the repair provision as a remedy limitation, finding "no conceptual distinction
between saying that a product is warranted for one year against defects, the remedy being limited
to repair or replacement and saying that should a breach be discovered within one year, the
seller will repair or replace defective parts. Both are warranties explicitly extending to future
performance." 587 F.2d at 821 n.17. If there is in fact no difference between the two statements,
the fact that the time term was contained in the repair provision should arguably not play a
role in the action accrual date determination since the time term may apply, under this analysis,
to the warranty as a whole, including the promise regarding defects. If, however, a remedy may
not extend to future performance under U.C.C. § 2-725(2), the location of the time term is
critical because a provision without a time term probably cannot be given prospective treatment.
See supra note 11. If a repair provision can, as the Standard Alliance court acknowledged, extend lo future performance under U.C.C. § 2-725(2), it must be asked how such a provision
could be breached, as the R. W. Murray court found, upon discovery of the defect rather than
upon breach of that provision - failure to repair - as required in this section of the Code.
(It is not clear whether the contract considered in Rochester Welding, 78 A.D.2d at 983, 433
N.Y.S.2d at 889, contained a time term.)
62. As to the validity of separating different warranty obligations for action accrual date
purposes, see supra note 41.
63. See Shapiro v. Long Island Lighting Co., 71 A.D.2d 671,671,418 N.Y.S.2d 948, 950
(1979); Dennin v. General Motors Corp., 78 Misc. 2d 451, 452, 357 N.Y.S.2d 668, 670 (1974).
See also infra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
64. See infra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
65. Standard Alliance Indus. v. Black Clawson Co., 587 F.2d 813 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
441 U.S. 923 (1979).
66. Id. at 821 n.17.
67. In footnote 17 of the court's opinion (quoted supra note 42) no mention is made of
0
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On the other hand, courts applying the on-delivery rule to repair provisions have recognized the importance of the "goods" requirement
but have ignored both the additional language in section 2-725(2) limiting
the on-delivery rule to warranties 68 and the obvious forward-looking
nature of repair provisions. Thus, cases applying the Code language
err both when they apply the on-delivery rule to repair provisions and
when they apply the future performance exception to such provisions.
As a result, a court considering a repair warranty is left without applicable Code language relating to the appropriate action accrual date.
A court facing this situation, however, may decide to apply neither
the on-delivery rule nor the future performance exception, but look
to law outside the Code for the proper rule. 69 This is permitted, and
probably required, by section 1-103, which provides that principles of
law and equity not displaced by Code rules supplement the Code's
provisions. 70 Thus, in making the determination required by section
2-725(2) as to the date of breach,7' a court may consider and apply
non-Code law.
C.

The Answer Outside the Code

A substantial body of law holding that repair warranties are breached
only upon the seller's failure to repair does not find its root in the
Uniform Commercial Code. Although non-Code law cannot conclusively
the "goods" term in U.C.C. § 2-725(2). See Standard Alliance, 587 F.2d at 821 n.17; cf. Glen
Peck Ltd. v. Fritsche, 651 P.2d 414, 415 (Colo. App. 1981).
68. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
69. Two cases, Space Leasing Assocs. v. Atlantic Bldg. Sys., Inc., 144 Ga. App. 320, 325,
241 S.E.2d 438,441 (1977), and Shapiro v. Long Island Lighting Co., 71 A.D.2d 671,418 N.Y.S.2d
948 (1979), can be said to be both sources of non-Code case law and instances in which a court,
interpreting § 2-725, drew on non-Code law. See infra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.
70. U.C.C. § 1-103 is entitled "Supplementary General Principles of Law Applicable" and
provides in full: "Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles of
law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract, principal
and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other
validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions." Professor Summers has made
a persuasive case for interpreting U.C.C. § 1-103 to allow courts to modify and create exceptions
to Code provisions where equitable principles are involved. See Summers, General Equitable
Principles under Section 1-103 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 906, 935
(1978); see also J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 20 (§ 1-103 ;mposes a "duty" to
apply general equitable principles unless displaced); Jacobs v. Metro Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
125 Ga. App. 462,467, 188 S.E.2d 250, 253, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 771, 775 (1972);
E. RE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EQUITY AND EQUITABLE REMEDIES 13-14 (1975) ("[e]quity will
not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy"; "[e]quity regards substance rather than form").
71. U.C.C. § 2-725(2) requires, in all breach of contract actions, that the cause of action
accrue when the breach occurs. As is the case with the § 2-725(1) four year rule, see supra note
5, this requirement is general and would seem to apply in any contract action involving the sale
of goods. Thus, any non-Code rule establishing an action accrual date different than the date
of breach or establishing a different limitations period would be displaced by the Code.
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establish· that repair warranties are breached upon failure to repair,
this body of law can provide a sound basis for such a conclusion.
1. Warranties Ineligible for Code Treatment- Several courts considering warranties that were or are ineligible for Code treatment have
concluded that an action accrues on a repair obligation only upon the
seller's failure to repair. In one case, the court considered a contract7 2
for which an action had accrued before the Code's effective date in
Missouri. 73 The court found that the contract, which provided that
the goods would meet certain specifications and that the defendant
would remedy defects that appeared within one year of a specified date,
had been breached, if at any time, on the day one year after that date. 74
Thus, the limitations period had begun at the end of the interval during
which defendant had agreed to remedy any defects. 75 In an earlier case,
the parties had executed two agreements, one in which defend ant had
promised to build a silo in a "substantial and workmanlike manner,"
and one in which defend ant had promised "to repair or replace defects
free of charge for a period of ten years." 16 Although the court found
that the first promise had been breached upon completion of construction when defendant had failed to build the silo in a workmanlike manner, it found that the repair promise had "continued" for ten years
after completion, so that the action on this promise was not barred
by the statute after this ten year period. 77 Finally, in a recent nonCode case, a home builder had contracted to remedy defects called
to its attention within one year of the closing date. 78 The court found
that the cause of action had not accrued until the defendant had re-

72. See supra note 47.
73. See Baldwin Plaza Corp. v. H.B. Deal Constr. Co., 462 S.W.2d 687, 689 (Mo. 1971).
74. Id. at 688-89; cf. Neal v. Laclede Gas Co., 517 S.W.2d 716, 718 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974)
(citing Ballwin Plaza) (action for breach of one-year "guarantee" did not accrue until end of
guarantee period during which defendant must have had opportunity to make repairs).
75. 462 S.W.2d at 689-90. But see id. at 689 (statute provided that cause of action accrued
when damage "capable of ascertainment").
76. See Krueger v. V.P. Christianson Silo Co., 206 Wis. 460, 460-61, 240 N.W. 145. 145 (1932).
77. 206 Wis. at 462-63, 240 N.W. at 146; see also Fowler v. A & A Co., 262 A.2d 344, 347-48
(D.C. 1970) (home improvement "guarantee," construed as "promise to do whatever
is necessary, including repair of improperly performed work, to provide the guaranteed dry basement," breached only upon total repudiation of the contract). In Kaiser Cement & Gypsum
Corp. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 35 Cal. App. 3d 948, I 11 Cal. Rptr. 210 (1973), apparently
a pre-Code case, the court found that a "warranty to repair" was breached when the manufacturer indicated that the goods were not in need of repair. Id. at 957-59, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 215-17.
Because the manufacturer had offered separate, prospective, express no-defects warranties, however,
the court held that the limitations period had not begun until the purchaser had discovered the
defect. Id. at 958-61, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 217-19.
78. See Spinoso v. Rio Rancho Estates, Inc., 96 N.M. 5, 7, 626 P.2d 1307, 1309 (1981).
In Spinoso, the case was beyond the scope of the Code presumably because the contract related
to construction of a home, which is not a "good" under U.C.C. § 2-105(1).
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fused to cure the defect. 79 Thus, cases in which the Code was not
available for application indicate that the statute of limitations for repair
provisions begins to run only upon failure to repair.
2. The Repair Warranty as Exception to Code Action Accrual Date
Provisions- Even in cases in which the Code might otherwise have
been applicable some courts have found that repair provisions are
excepted from ordinary Code action accrual date requirements. One
court found that although a breach of warranty generally occurs upon
delivery, in the case of repair warranties, ''it is the refusal to remedy
within a reasonable time, or a lack of success in the attempts to remedy
which would constitute a breach of warranty." 80 Thus, the action could
accrue only after the seller failed to repair. Although the court quoted
(in a footnote) section 2-725(2) in full, it avoided any mention of the
future performance exception. 81 Perhaps because it realized that repair
provisions do not promise performance of the goods as required by
Code language, 82 the court cited non-section 2-725 precedent as authority
for giving the repair provision prospective treatment. 83
In two other cases, 84 the courts implicitly established an exception

79. 96 N.M. at 9 & n.3, 626 P.2d at 1311 & n.3.
SO. See Space Leasing Assoc. v. Atlantic Bldg. Systems, 144 Ga. App. 320, 325, 241 S.E.2d
438, 441 (1977) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). The provision in question was a sixyear warranty of "workmanship and material" under which the seller's "obligation [was) to
furnish to the building site replacement material" in case of defect. 144 Ga. App. at 321, 241
S.E.2d at 439.
SI. Id. at 324-25 n.3, 241 S.E.2d at 439 n.3.
82. See supra text accompanying notes 14-16.
83. The court cited Jacobs v. Metro Chrysler-Plymouth, 125 Ga. App. 462, 188 S.E.2d 250
(1972); General Motors Corp. v. Halco Instruments, Inc., 124 Ga. App. 630, 185 S.E.2d 619
(1971); and Ford Motor Corp. v. Gunn, 123 Ga. App. 550, 181 S.E.2d 694 (1971).
84. See Dennin v. General Motors Corporation, 78 Misc. 2d 451, 357 N.Y.S.2d 668 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1974); Shapiro v. Long Island Lighting Co., 71 A.D.2d 671,418 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1979).
In Dennin, defendant-manufacturer argued that a one-year warranty promising that the product
was not defective and that the manufacturer would correct defects in "material and workmanship" constituted a contractual limitation of the limitations period. 78 Misc. 2d at 452, 357 N.Y.S.2d
at 670. See U.C.C. § 2-725(1) (quoted supra note 3). While the court noted§ 2-725, it ignored
the future performance of the goods exception, finding that the warranty
establishe[d] by its plain language a period during which a cause of action might accrue
for failure to repair or replace a defect in material or workmanship. By this warranty
if a covered defect is brought to the attention of the seller during this period and the
seller fails to repair, or at its option replace the part, a cause of action in favor of
the buyer arises upon which he may sue for a period of four years thereafter.
78 Misc. 2d at 452, 357 N. Y .S.2d at 670 (emphasis added).
In Shapiro, ·the court found that a ten-year guarantee against "tank failure" (arguably a warranty of product performance) did not promise performance of the product under U.C.C. §
2-725(2) and thus that the limitations period had expired at delivery. 71 A.D.2d at 671, 418
N.Y.S.2d at 950. The court noted, however, that the warranty contained a promise that the
manufacturer would replace the product if it developed a leak within ten years after installation.
Id. Based on this provision, the court found that plaintiff had a cause of action that was not
barred: "Because the contract warranty is good for 10 years by its own terms, it is evident that
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to the Code's requirements, finding that the language of the repair
provision itself revealed the parties' intent to create a future obligation. 85
Thus, a non-Code explanation - the parties' own agreement - was
offered for giving the repair provision prospective treatment. 86
3. Breach of Repair Warranty Possible Only Where Seller Has Failed
to Remedy Defects- Many courts, without addressing the statute of
limitations question, have found that a repair warranty is not breached
until the seller has had an opportunity to remedy defects and has
failed to do so. 87 These findings are consistent with the often quoted
rule that where the agreement provides the seller the right to remedy
defects, a finding of breach does not require the buyer to permit the
seller ''to tinker with the article indefinitely in the hope that it may
ultimately be made to comply with the warranty." 88 If the seller may
it survives the four year statute of limitations in some respects. The seller has promised to replace
a defective unit for IO years and that promise is undoubtedly enforceable by the buyer." Id.
(emphasis added). Thus, the statute had not run on the IO-year promise to replace. (The decision
indicates that ten years had not passed since ·delivery of the product. Nevertheless, because the
guarantee was held to be enforceable more than four years after the delivery of the product,
the accrual date for the purposes of the statute of limitations must have been thought to have
been later than the date of delivery.)
85. In at least one case a court has adopted without§ 2-725 analysis the plain language rule
found in Dennin and Shapiro. See Lieb v. Milne, 95 N.M. 716, 625 P.2d 1233 (1980). In Lieb,
where defendant was bound by a warranty to repair, the court ruled that "if Milne refused
to provide the warranted service, the action was perfected at that time-subject only to the statutory
time limit for filing an action." Id. at 720, 625 P .2d at 1237 (emphasis added) (citing Dennin
v. General Motors Corp., 78 Misc. 2d 451, 357 N.Y.S. 668 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974) ("plain
language")). Cf. Ballwin Plaza Corp. v. H.B. Deal Constr. Co., 462 S.W.2d 687, 689 (Mo.
1971) ("language" of contract, specifications, and defendant's letter to plaintiff).
86. Cf. U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (effect of Code's provisions may be varied by the parties, except
as otherwise provided in the Code).
87. See Rose v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 212 Cal. App. 2d 755, 763, 28 Cal. Rptr. 185, 190
(1963); Allen v. Brown, 181 Kan. 301,308,310 P.2d 923,928 (1957); Draffin v. Chrysler Motors
Corp., 252 S.C. 348, 352, 166 S.E.2d 305, 308 (1969); Cannon v. Pulliam Motor Co., 230 S.C.
131, 140, 94 S.E.2d 397, 400 (1956); see also Kaiser Cement & Gypsum Corp. v. Allis-Chalmers
Mfg. Co., 35 Cal. App. 3d 948, 958-59, 111 Cal. Rptr. 210,217 (1973); Patron Aviation, Inc.
v. Teledyne Indus., Inc., 154 Ga. App. 13, 16, 267 S.E.2d 274, 278 (1980) (quoting Space Leasing Assocs. v. At!. Bldg. Sys., 144 Ga. App. 320, 325, 241 S.E.2d 438, 441 (1977)); Ford Motor
Co. v. Gunn, 123 Ga. App. 550, 551, 181 S.E.2d 694, 696 (1971); Mueller v. Keeley, 165 Neb.
243, 259, 85 N.W.2d 309, 318 (1957); Kure v. Chevrolet Motor Div., 581 P.2d 603, 608 (Wyo.
1978); cf. Fargo Mach. & Tool Co. v. Kearney & Trecker Corp., 428 F. Supp. 364, 374 (E.D.
Mich. 1977); Beal v. General Motors Corp., 354 F. Supp. 423, 426 (D. Del. 1973) (failure to
repair is breach under warranty to repair); Courtesy Ford Sales, Inc. v. Farrior, 53 Ala. App.
94, 102, 298 So.2d 26, 33, IS U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 85, 91 (1974) (same) Seely v. White
Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 14, 403 P.2d 145, 148, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 20, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 915, 918 (1965) (same); Jacobs v. Metro Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 125 Ga. App.
462,467, 188 S.E.2d 250,253, IO U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 771,776 (1972) (same); Givan
v. Mack Truck, Inc., 569 S.W.2d 243,247 (Mo. App. 1978) (same); Ford Motor Co. v. Puskar,
394 S.W.2d I, 14 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) (same), modified on other grounds, 417 S.W.2d 262
(Tex. I 967).
88. 77 C.J.S. Sales§ 340 (1952); see Schroeder v. Fageol Motors, Inc., 12 Wash. App. 161,
165,528 P.2d 992,995 (1974) (and cases cited therein), rev'd in part on other grounds, 86 Wash.
2d 256, 544 P.2d 20 (1975); Kure v. Chevrolet Motor Div., 581 P.2d 603, 608 (Wyo. 1978)
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not tinker indefinitely, he is probably permitted to tinker for a
reasonable time without being in breach. Thus, the seller is not in breach
during the time before the reasonable repair period has elapsed, including the time before the seller has been notified of a defect. Although
these cases do not address the question of when the statute of limitations begins to run, they do establish the date of breach. Because the
date of breach is the date at which the limitations period begins under
section 2-725, 89 under these cases the statute of limitations would begin
to run on the date of failure to repair.

II.

THE POLICY CONSIDERATIONS OF A SENSIBLE ACTION
ACCRUAL DATE FOR REPAIR WARRANTIES

In order to arrive at a sensible solution to the problem of when an
action accrues for repair warranties, it is necessary to consider important policies furthered by applying a failure-to-repair rule to such warranties. It is also necessary to examine the objectives of the on-delivery
rule and determine whether this rule serves those objectives in the context of repair warranties.

A.

Policies Served by a Failure-to-Repair Rule

Two policies are served by application of a failure-to-repair rule
to repair provisions: such a rule allows the limitations period to begin
only when the seller has breached its obligation; and such a rule gives
a repair provision prospective treatment in a manner consistent with
the purpose of the Code's future performance exception.
1. Under a Failure-to-Repair Rule an Action Accrues Only When
the Buyer May Sue for Failure to Repair- A failure-to-repair rule
would be in accord with the sensible and almost universal principle
that the statute of limitations begins to run only when the aggrieved
party has the present right to sue. 90 A repair provision requires the
(and authorities cited therein). It is also well established that "if the contract so stipulates, the
seller's liability . . . does not attach until he has had an opportunity to remedy defects, and
where such opportunity is afforded him his failure or refusal fixes his liability." 77 C.J.S. Sales
§ 340 (1952). Accord General Motors Corp. v. Halco Instruments, Inc., 124 Ga. App. 630, 635,
185 S.E.2d 619, 622 (1971); Russo v. Hilltop Lincoln-Mercury, 479 S.W.2d 211, 212-13 (Mo.
App. 1972); Hole v. General Motors Corp., 83 A.D.2d 715,717,442 N.Y.S.2d 638,640 (1981);
see also 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions§ 136 (1948 & Supp. 1983) (where warranty relates
to future event, action does not accrue until occurrence of that event); Au v. Au, 63 Hawaii
210,219,626 P.2d 173, 180 (1981) (same); Brown v. Ellison, 304 N.W.2d 197,200 (Iowa 1981)
(same).
89. See supra text accompanying note 36.
90. See Ballwin Plaza Corp. v. H.B. Deal Constr. Co., 462 S.W.2d 687, 690 (Mo. 1971);
Continental Casualty Co. v. Grabe Brick Co .. I Ariz. App. 214,217,401 P.2d 168, 171 (1965)
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seller (expressly or by implication) to repair only when a defect in the
goods appears. Unlike the seller who warrants that the goods are currently free from defects, the seller who promises to repair has no obligation unless and until a defect manifests itself. As a result, the buyer
cannot sue until the seller has attempted to repair after the appearance
of any defect. 91 Hence, the limitations period should not begin until
the seller's attempt to repair has been unsuccessful.
It might be objected that the Code drafters decided to apply an ondelivery rule in many cases in which the plaintiff has not suffered discernible damage at delivery. Code section 2-725(2) emphasizes this possibility by providing that the action accrues "when the breach occurs,
regardless of the aggrieved party's knowledge of the breach. " 92
Nonetheless, this language does not require that an action for breach
of a repair promise accrue at delivery. Because the seller has no repair
obligation at delivery, no breach of the repair promise, known or
unknown to the buyer, can occur at delivery. 93 Thus, the action should
not be held to accrue at delivery.
(quoting I C.J.S. Actions§ 124(a) (1936); Amy v. City of Dubuque, 98 U.S. 470, 476 (1879));
Grand Island School Dist. No. 2 v. Celotex Corp., 203 Neb. 559, 562, 279 N.W.2d 603, 606
(1979) ("traditional rule"); Neal v. Laclede Gas Co., 517 S.W.2d 716, 718 (Mo. App. 1974);
Gabriel v. Al habbal, 618 S.W.2d 894, 896 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981) (and cases cited therein) ("general
rule of contract law"). Even if the purchaser's claim is characterized as a remedy, it is commonly
accepted that "[w]here there is no present right to pursue [that] remedy against a party, but
such right arises only on the doing of an act by him which puts him in default, the statute
runs only from the default." 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions§ 110 (1948).
91. "When the existence of an obligation is conditioned upon some event or contingency,
the cause of action accrues when, and only when, such event or contingency happens unless
by interference of one of the parties its happening is prevented." I C.J .S. Actions§ 124(c) (1936).
See also Ginn v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 119, 122 (5th Cir. 1969); Rogers
v. Cowley, FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 199,178, at 95,686 (N.D. Ga. 1983); Nicholson v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 517 F. Supp. 1046, 1052 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Kaufman v. Albin, 447
A.2d 761, 763 (Del. Ch. 1982); Matchett v. Rose, 36 Ill. App. 3d 638, 648, 344 N.E.2d 770,
778 (1976); Kielb v. Couch, 149 N.J. Super. 522, 528-29, 374 A.2d 79, 82-83 (Law Div. 1977);
John J. Kassner & Co. v. City of New York, 46 N.Y.2d 544, 550, 389 N.E.2d 99, 102, 415
N.Y.S.2d 785, 788 (1979); Bernstein v. Allstate Ins. Co., 56 Misc. 2d 341, 342, 288 N.Y.S.2d
646, 648 (1968); Pitts v. Wetzel, 498 S.W.2d 27, 28-29 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973); cf. U.C.C. §
3-122 & Off. Com. I (action accrual date for commercial paper). But see State Farm Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Kilbreath, 419 So.2d 632, 633 (Fla. 1982), rev'g 401 So.2d 846 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981);
Dillon v. Lintz, 582 S.W.2d 394,395 (Tex. 1981), rev'g 568 S.W.2d 147 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
Unless the contingency, here the buyer's presentation of evidence of a defect to the seller,
occurs, the buyer cannot establish the obligation that would make possible the breach essential
to any contract claim. See Hodge v. Service Mach. Co., 438 F.2d 347, 349 (6th Cir. 1971).
Moreoever, even after the repair obligation exists, the seller must fail to fulfill that obligation
before the buyer's action accrues. See, e.g., First Bank & Trust Co. v. Cannon, 164 Ga. App.
449, 451, 297 S.E.2d 349, 351 (1982) (contract claim arises only when contract breached); G.P.
Enters., Inc. v. Adkins, 543 S.W.2d 913, 915 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (cause of action on contract
only where there is a breach).
92. See U.C.C. § 2-725(2) (quoted supra note 3). Unlike the future performance exception
and the on-delivery rule, this provision reaches the repair obligation under current law. See supra
note 71.
93. Where the warranty contains no promise regarding defects or where the seller's obliga-
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2. A Failure-to-Repair Rule is Consistent with the Purpose of the
Section 2-725(2) Future Performance Exception- Regardless of the
time at which the buyer may sue on a repair obligation, the purpose
of the section 2-725(2) exception is to give prospective warranties prospective effect in the law of the statute of limitations. 94 Where a
manufacturer promises to repair at the future time at which the goods
are in need of repair, its promise is clearly as prospective as that of
a manufacturer offering the typical prospective no-defects warranty
- one that "promise[s] performance of the product not merely at the
moment of purchase but at some future date as well." 95 While repair
promises may not relate to the "product" in a fashion contemplated
by the Code drafters, 96 such promises are ''representation[s] that
something will be done in the future," and, as such, cannot "be true
or false at the time when [they are] made." 97 Thus, as does the prospective no-defects warranty, a promise to repair at a future time should
receive the benefit of a statute of limitations that runs only after the

tion is expressly limited to repair, there is simply no duty of which the purchaser can allege
a breach before failure to repair. See Rochester Welding Supply Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 78
A.D.2d 983, 984, 433 N.Y.S.2d 888, 889 (1980); see also supra notes 87-89 and accompanying
text. While a buyer holding a no-defects warranty could at least theoretically assert an action
for breach of warranty upon delivery - the defect (and thus damages) being present but not
apparent - a buyer with only a right to repair hasn't a scintilla of present right to sue on the
date of delivery.
Even where a nonexclusive repair obligation is accompanied by a no-defects provision, no
breach of the no-defects provision of real legal consequence occurs before failure to repair since
the means identified for enforcing the seller's promise are repair and replacement. See Dennin
v. General Motors Corp., 78 Misc. 2d 451,452, 357 N.Y.S.2d 668, 670 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974).
Clearly where a dual no-defects/repair warranty is construed as giving the buyer no more than
a right to repair, see e.g., Hansen v. F.M.C. Corp., 32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 828,
832-33 (D. Kan. 1981); Voth v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 218 Kan. 644, 647, 651-52, 545 P.2d
371, 374-75, 378 (1976); Shapiro v. Long Island Lighting Co., 71 A.D.2d 671,671,418 N.Y.S.2d
948, 949-50 (1979); Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Central Eng'g & Equip. Co., 611 P.2d 863,
865, 871 (Wyo. 1980), even a theoretical breach at delivery should not be found. More importantly, though, no breach whatsoever of the repair obligation can occur at delivery because this
obligation does not exist at delivery - it exists only in the event of a defect. Hence, the repair
obligation may be given independent prospective treatment, especially where such obligation itself
contains the time term. See generally supra note 41.
94. See Holdridge v. Heyer-Schulte Corp., 440 F. Supp. 1088, 1101 (N.D.N.Y. 1977) (§ 2-725(2)
is consistent with pre-Code law that "[a] prospective warranty related to the future state of goods,
and a cause of action for the breach of such a warranty accrued at the time the breach could
have been discovered") (citations omitted). In addition, if the "performance of the goods" obstacle
in § 2-725(2) is bypassed, repair provisions appear to be precisely within the language describing
the second requirement of the exception .:_ that is, such provisions are always of such a nature
that "discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance." See U.C.C. § 2-725(2)
(quoted supra note 3).
95. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 420 (discussing Rempe v. General Elec.
Co., 28 Conn. Supp. 160, 254 A.2d 577 (Super. Ct. 1969)).
96. See supra text accompanying notes 15-16. But see supra note 17.
97. See Hanover Modular Homes, Inc. v. Scottish Inns of Am., Inc., 443 F. Supp. 888, 892
(W.D. La. 1978).
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seller's promise has actually been breached. 98
Of course, if section 2-725 's policy of giving prospective effect to
prospective warranties is to have meaning in the case of repair warranties, the label attached to the repair promise cannot be allowed to determine when an action for breach of that promise is held to accrue.
Regardless whether a repair promise is characterized as a remedy or
as a warranty, it is a promise - a contractual obligation - to act
in the future 99 that can be breached only in the future. To allow mere
characterization of the repair promise as a remedy to prevent it from
receiving its logically prospective construction 100 would constitute a
return to the formalism 101 long abandoned by practical, modern law. 102
98. Some courts have held that the statute of limitations is tolled while the seller attempts
to repair the goods. See, e.g., Little Rock School Dist. v. Celotex Corp., 264 Ark. 757, 757,
574 S.W.2d 669, 674 (1978); see also U.C.C. § 2-725(4). See generally Annot., 68 A.L.R.3d
1277 (1976). This, however, is not the predominating view. See, e.g., Triangle Underwriters, Inc.
v. Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737, 743 (2d Cir. 1979); Standard Alliance Indus. v. Black Clawson
Co., 587 F.2d 813, 819 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979); KIF Dev. & Inv.
Co. v. Williamson Crane & Dozer Corp., 367 So. 2d 1078, 1080 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Zahler
v. Star Steel Co., 50 Mich. App. 386,390,213 N.W.2d 269, 270 (1973); see also Thalrose v.
General Motors Corp., 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1257, 1258 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977) (cited
in Zahler and Triangle Underwriters). Note, however, that the cases that hold that the statute
of limitations is not tolled often involve simple warranties against defects that do not extend
to future performance. Thus, breach is reasonably held to occur upon delivery. In any event,
a jurisdiction willing to toll the statute of limitations during repairs, presumably because the
buyer would not and could not sue during this period, might be receptive to the argument that
the statute should not begin to run on a repair warranty until the seller has failed to repair.
99. See Owens v. Patent Scaffolding Co., 77 Misc. 2d 992, 998, 354 N.Y.S.2d 778, 784,
14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 610, 617 (1974) ("a promise to repair is an express warranty
that the promise to repair will be honored") (citing Zoss v. Royal Chevrolet, Inc., 11 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 527, 532 (Ind. Super. Ct. 1972)), rev'd on other grounds, 50 A.D.2d 866,
376 N. Y .S.2d 948 (1975).
100. See supra notes 18, 23-30 and accompanying text; see also supra note 51.
IOI. The late Professor Karl Llewellyn, the "chief draftsman" of the Code (especially Articles
One and Two), see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 4-6, roundly criticized the "Formal
Style":
Sense, the ways of men with words, the ways of businessmen in dealing, these are irrelevant and literally inadmissible: they do not get into the hall, to be heard or considered. Generations of law students were introduced to their profession by way of these
strange ideas, and courts have in consequence made actual decisions in their image,
sometimes with a touch of patent Parkeian pleasure as the pretty little puzzle-pieces
lock together to leave for hundreds of good business promises no legal container but
the garbage can.
K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION, DECIDING APPEALS 39 (1960).
102. Another important policy may be frustrated where these provisions are not given their
intended effect in cases of warranties with a stated obligation period longer than four years.
In such cases, if the delivery rule is applied, the purchaser may be denied the opportunity to
redress a defect in the product during the portion of the period stated in the warranty that exceeds the limitations period. Under a five-year repair warranty, e.g.; supra note 4; cf. Shapiro
v. Long Island Lighting Co., 71 A.D.2d 671,418 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1979) (JO-year warranty), once
four years had passed, see U.C.C. § 2-725(2), the purchaser would be left with no means to
enforce the warranty agreement. In effect, the purchaser would receive only four years of warranty protection. And because, under such warranties, the only cause of action available to such
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Using the Failure-to-Repair Rule to Meet the Goals
of the On-Delivery Rule

Three general purposes are thought to be served by an on-delivery
rule: 103 it provides a fixed limit beyond which there can be no liability
for breach of warranty; it protects manufacturers from unfounded suits;
and it reflects the nature of the warranty as primarily promising a certain condition of the goods at delivery. These purposes, however, are
best served in the context of nonprospective no-defects warranties, and
are much less persuasive as justifications for an on-delivery rule in the
case of repair warranties.
J .. The Failure-to-Repair Rule Places a Time Limit on SuitsApplication of a failure-to-repair rule to repair warranties would allow
a seller to gain the certain knowledge as to the last possible date of suit 1 04
a purchaser is an action claiming that the manufacturer has failed to repair as warranted, see
Rochester Welding Supply Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 78 A.D.2d 983, 984, 433 N.Y.S.2d 888,
889 (1980), the purchaser's action for breach of warranty would be time barred before he ever,
in fact, had a cause of action.
Yet another undesirable consequence of application of the on-delivery rule is apparent where the
parties have limited the statute of limitations by contract, as permitted under U.C.C. § 2-725(1).
In the case of an agreement to limit the limitations period to one year, see, e.g., Standard Alliance
Indus. v. Black Clawson Co., 587 F.2d 813, 818 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923
(1979), if the purchaser fails to notify the manufacturer before the one year period has elapsed,
the purchaser's cause of action for breach of warranty to repair is barred by the explicit statement in the warranty that the manufacturer's obligation exists only for a one year period. Assuming,
however, that the defect manifested itself after 364 days, that the purchaser immediately notified
the manufacturer of the defect, and that, at that point, the manufacturer refused to repair, under
the on-delivery rule, the purchaser would have only one day to file suit. Even if the purchaser were
allowed a reasonable period of time - perhaps a few weeks - after the manufacturer's failure
to repair in which he might file suit, the result would be unfair. It is doubtful that the drafters
of the Code and the legislatures of the states contemplated a limitations period of only days
or weeks, even where the parties had expressly agreed to limit the limitations period to one year.
If the parties have agreed to a one year limitations period, any reasonable ruling would allow
the purchaser a full year during which he might file suit after the manufacturer has failed to
fulfill his obligations, regardless of the date of delivery.
103. Statutes of limitations in general are often justified in terms of the legal system's need
for fresh evidence. See Special Project, supra note 20, at 269 & n.1013 (citing 75 W. VA. L.
REv. 201, 206 (1972); Developments in the Law - Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV.
1177, 1185 (1950)). This rationale should play no role where there is no evidence available at
the early point at which breach might otherwise be held to occur. While an on-delivery rule
furthers the fresh evidence policy in the case of a no-defects warranty, in the case of a suit
for breach of warranty to repair, there is simply no evidence (not even undiscovered evidence,
see supra note 93) available at the delivery date to show breach of the repair obligation. Similarly,
the justification for statutes of limitations that plaintiffs should not be rewarded for "sleeping"
on their rights, see Dincher v. Marlin Firearms Co., 198 F.2d 821, 823 (2d Cir. 1952); McCroskey
v. Bryant Air Conditioning Co., 524 S.W.2d 487, 489 (Tenn. 1975), or protected from "ignorance" of their rights, see Brown v. Ellison, 304 N.W.2d 197, 201 (Iowa 1981); Krueger v.
V.P. Christianson Silo Co., 206 Wis. 460, 240 N.W. 145, 146 (1932), is inapposite here.
104. See Jackson v. General Motors Corp., 223 Tenn. 12, 18, 441 S.W.2d 482, 484, cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 942 (1969) (on-delivery rule prevents possibility that "there would never be
a time that a suit could not be brought"); cf. J .. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 422
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that a fixed limit 1 05 on-delivery rule would allow. If the seller offered
a one year warranty, a failure-to-repair rule would require that the maximum period of potential liability be five years 106 - the one-year repair
obligation period plus the four year limitations period. If a defect
manifested itself on the last day of the twelfth month of the warranty
and the purchaser brought the defect to the attention of the manufacturer on that day, at which point the manufacturer failed to repair, the
purchaser could bring an action no more than four y:ears later. As a result,
there is no possibility of indefinite liability. 107
2. A Failure-to-Repair Rule Would Not Subject Sellers to Increased
Risk of Unfounded Suits- Although a policy of preventing unfounded suits 108 is not, on its face, unreasonable, a buyer holding a repair
warranty is no more likely to pursue an unfounded claim- than is a
buyer holding an ordinary prospective no-defects warranty. While an
on-delivery rule would protect a seller from unfounded suits brought
more than four years after delivery, this policy argues for an early
action accrual date in any case. If suits are to be barred because they
are potentially unfounded, there is no reason to distinguish between
repair warranties and warranties currently given prospective treatment
under the Code. Moreover, to the extent that this argument assumes
that many claims. are spurious because the failure of the product is
due to lack of proper product use or care 109 it is unpersuasive here;
most warranties themselves disclaim any obligation to repair where product failure is caused by abuse, misuse, or lack of proper care. 110 Even
where the warranty does not contain such a disclaimer, product failure
due to abuse is most likely not within the terms of the usual repair
warranty provision promising to repair products that fail due to a
defect. 111
3. Repair Provisions do not Warrant the Condition of the Goods
at the Time of Delivery- An on-delivery rule that is ordinarily ap(both U.C.C. § 2-607 and statutes of limitations give the seller the "mind balm" of being able
to close his books on the past at a given point); Standard Alliance Indus. v. Black Clawson
Co., 587 F.2d 813, 820 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979) (statutes of limitations
allow seller to be free of "worry" after a certain point); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 835 (5th ed.
I 979) (statutes of limitation are statutes of "repose").
105. See Alris, Inc. v. Gojer, 75 Misc. 2d 962,965, 349 N.Y.S.2d 948, 952 (1973); accord
Raymond-Dravo-Langenfelder v. Microdot, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 614, 618 (D. Del. 1977); see also
Centennial Ins. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 74 Mich. App. 169, 172,253 N.W.2d 696, 697 (1977).
106. Of course, the maximum period during which a seller might be sued under any warranty,
absent tolling, see supra note 98, is computed by adding the warranty period to the limitations
period.
107. See also supra note 41.
108. See, e.g., Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340,346,253 N.E.2d 207,
210, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490, 495 (1969).
109. Id.
110. See, e.g., supra note 4.
111. Id.
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plied ''because the condition of the goods at the time of delivery is
central" 112 is not sensibly applied to repair warranties. Because the seller
warrants in the usual situation only that, at delivery, the goods will
conform to specifications, an on-delivery rule may often be reasonable.
The condition of the goods at delivery, however, is not central to the
manufacturer's obligation under a repair warranty. Indeed, the presence
of a repair provision indicates that the manufacturer recognizes the
possibility that the goods may at some future point require repair the warranty assumes that the condition of the goods may vary from
that which is expected and warrants only that when such variation is
apparent needed repairs will be made. 113 Hence, the objective of the
on-delivery rule that the action accrual date should reflect the nature
of the warranty in question is met where a failure-to-repair rule is applied to repair warranties.
III.

A SUGGESTION FOR AMENDMENT OF CURRENT CODE LANGUAGE

Because repair warranties are of a prospective nature they should
be accorded the same treatment in the law of the statute of limitations
as that accorded prospective no-defects warranties under Code section
2-725(2)'s future performance exception. Nonetheless, the courts have
given repair warranties such treatment only infrequently. The construction of repair provisions as remedy limitations significantly reduces
the likelihood that such provisions will receive the benefit of a limitations period beginning only at the date of failure to repair. 114 Amendment of the current language of section 2-725 is one means of solving
this problem.

A.

The Proposed Amendment

The following amendment (proposed subsections (5), (6), (7), (8),
and (9)) is suggested:
112. See Special Project, supra note 20, at 270. Two phrases in the § 2-725(2) language confirm the impression that the on-delivery rule exists for this reason. First, the subsection's first
sentence states that the "cause of action accrues when the breach occurs regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach." U.C.C. § 2-725(2) (emphasis added). This
language appears to be designed for the situation where the seller's promise relates to the state
of the goods at the time of delivery and where a defect is not apparent at that time. Second,
the future performance exception requires that "discovery of the breach must await the time
of such performance . . . " Id. (emphasis added). This language also seems to contemplate a
breach that occurs at delivery in the form of an undiscovered defect.
113. "Underlying the warranty to make needed repairs is the assumption that the goods may
fall into disrepair or otherwise malfunction." Owens v. Patent Scaffolding Co., 77 Misc. 2d
992, 999, 354 N.Y.S.2d 778, 785, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 610, 617 (1974), rev'd on
other grounds, 50 A.D.2d 866, 376 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1975).
114. See supra notes 9-30 and accompanying text.
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A repair-replacement warranty, as defined in subsection
(6) of this section, shall be construed as a warranty that
explicitly extends to future performance of the goods for
the purposes of subsection (2) of this section
A repair-replacement warranty is a written promise made
by the seller to the buyer containing both of the following
terms:
(a) an explicit statement that the seller will repair or
replace the goods in the event that a defect becomes
apparent;
(b) an explicit statement of the time period, even if this
period is a "lifetime" or is otherwise without limit,
for which the seller's obligation to repair or replace
exists.
In the case of a repair-replacement warranty, as defined
in subsection (6) of this section, including a warranty that
also promises that the goods are not defective, discovery
of the breach, for the purposes of subsection (2) of this
section, shall not be found to have occurred until the seller
failed to repair within a reasonable time after the seller
received notice of the defect(s).
The presence in a warranty of a promise that the goods
are not defective shall not preclude construction of such
warranty as a repair-replacement warranty under this section so long as the warranty satisfies the requirements of
subsection (6) of this section.
This section does not alter the law on warranties implied
in law.

B.

Commentary

This amendment 115 would establish that promises to repair for a
115. Two commentators have offered a proposal intended to resolve the problem of the proper construction, under U.C.C. § 2-725, of "future performance warranties" generally, including
warranties of the product itself and warranties of title. See Schmitt & Hanko, supra note 7,
at 331-32. This proposal expressly gives present treatment - applies the on-delivery rule - to
those warranties that would qualify as "warranties of description" under § 2-3 I 3(1)(b) or "warranties of conformity" under § 2-313(1 )(c). Id. at 331. Prospective treatment under the SchmittHanko (S-H) proposal would be reserved for "express warrant[ies) by promise or affirmation
(2-313(1)(a))." Id. The most important difference between the S-H proposal and the amendment
offered here is that, given the prevailing construction of repair provisions as remedy limitations
that cannot extend to future performance of the goods, see supra notes 18-30 and accompanying
text, such provisions could not themselves be given prospective treatment under the S-H proposal. Repair provisions would be denied such treatment under the S-H proposal because they
fail to relate, as required by the proposal's explicit reference to § 2-313(1)(a), to the "goods."
See supra note 33 and accompanying text. Although the repair provision may be a "promise
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specified period (incidental to a sale of goods) are warranties for the
purposes of Code section 2-725(2). Thus, even though such promises
would not "relate to the goods" in the section 2-313 sense, 116 the need
to apply non-Code action accrual date law to repair promises 111 would
be obviated. In addition, and of more consequence, the amendment
would require that repair warranties be given prospective treatment
under the subsection (2) future performance exception. This would have
the effect of codifying the rule that breach occurs and_ the statute of
limitations begins to run only upon the manufacturer's failure to repair
or replace in accordance with its warranty.
A repair warranty that contained a promise that the goods were not
defective would receive similar prospective treatment if that warranty
also contained both a promise that the seller would repair the goods
in the event of a defect and an explicit statement of the duration of
this obligation. A term requiring repair warranties containing promises
that the goods are not defective to state that repair is the seller's sole
obligation is not included because such a requirement is thought to
be too restrictive. 118
Subsection (7) would make it clear that buyers holding repair warranties have a reasonable period of time to secure repairs during which
or affirmation" as required by § 2-313(l)(a) and the S-H proposal, it does not relate to the
goods and cannot, therefore, be a "warranty" - a promise that the "goods shall conform."
See U.C.C. § 2-313(l)(a).
A second difference is that the S-H proposal would apply a discovery-of-defect rule to warranties it reached - the limitations period would begin when the purchaser discovered the defect.
See Schmitt & Hanko at 331. The amendment offered here would allow the action to accrue
on a repair warranty only upon the manufacturer's failure to repair.
Finally, the S-H proposal would give many implied warranties prospective treatment. Id. The
amendment proposed here does not abandon the sensible view that a manufacturer should not
be held to a delayed limitations period where it has not promised future performance. See supra
note 5. The S-H proposal's drafters have attempted to prevent the inadvertent creation of implied warranties that would receive prospective treatment by including a term stating that "[n]othing
·in this section affects the right to exclusion or modification of warranties (2-3 I 6)." See Schmitt
and Hanko at 331. This attempt will fail, however, in many situations. The Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act, enacted one year after the S-H proposal was offered, prohibits disclaimers of
many implied warranties where a supplier of a consumer product offers any express warranty.
See 15 U.S.C. § 2308(a) (1982). Thus, if the manufacturer offered a warranty - even an intentionally nonprospective no-defects warranty - its disclaimer of implied warranty would be invalid and any warranties implied in law would often be treated as prospective. Ironically, because,
unlike the Code, the Magnuson-Moss Act makes repair provisions warranties, see supra note
35, a manufacturer that offered a repair provision would often also effectively offer a prospective implied warranty. This would not be because the repair provision was a remedy limitation
for the implied warranty. (Often this cannot be the case. See supra note 19.) The action accrual
date would be later than delivery only because legally required implied warranties would receive
prospective treatment under the S-H proposal. Nevertheless, the repair provision itself would
not receive prospective treatment. Thus, a later-than-delivery action accrual date would be used
only because of the proposal's questionable inclusion of implied warranties in the group of warranties that would receive prospective treatment.
116. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 64-71 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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the statute would not run. 119 Under subsection (9), there would be no
change in the sensible current rule that an implied warranty cannot
receive prospective treatment. 1 20
By way of this amendment, the parties' reasonable expectations that
no breach could occur unless and until the seller failed to repair, and
that the statute of limitations for the purchaser's action on the warranty could not begin to run before this point, would not be
disappointed. 121
CONCLUSION

Great uncertainty exists whether a given court will find that the limitations period for a repair warranty begins at the time of delivery or
only after the purchaser's attempt to secure repairs has been unsuccessful. Courts applying the Code to repair warranties have reached
conflicting results based on generally unsatisfactory analysis. Courts
looking beyond the language of the Code have held that breach of
a repair warranty - and consequently the triggering of the statute of
limitations - can occur only after the manufacturer has failed to repair.
Policy considerations support the results reached by these courts, and
argue for an amendment to Code section 2-725 that at once recognizes
119. Some jurisdictions currently toll the statute of limitations during repairs. See supra note
98. Current subsection (4) of U.C.C. § 2-725 acknowledges this fact, providing in part: "This
section [§ 2-725 as a whole) does not alter the law on tolling of the statute of limitations
... " U .C.C. § 2-725(4). In a jurisdiction that tolled the statute during repairs, of course, the
proposed changes would eliminate only the time between delivery and the initiation of repair
efforts from the computation of the breach-to-suit period. In a jurisdiction that did not toll
the statute during repairs, any ruling that would require the inclusion of the repair period in
the computation of the breach-to-suit period would not apply to repair-replacement warranties.
In any case, there would be no actual inconsistency between the proposed changes and subsection (4) because the proposed changes do not toll the statute. The statute would not run for
any period before failure to repair.
120. See supra note 5.
121. It is possible that some manufacturers would be discouraged from providing repair provisions if a failure-to-repair rule were applied to such provisions. Three considerations, however,
make this seem less likely than one might suppose. First, a failure-to-repair rule would lengthen
not the period of the manufacturer's obligation to repair, but only the period during which the
manufacturer might be sued for failure to fulfill its warranty obligations. Second, under almost
any theory as to why warranties take the form they do, the manufacturer has an economic incentive to provide the written warranty terms it specifies, including repair provisions. See generally
Priest, supra note 2. Where the manufacturer intends the repair provision to limit its obligation
to the buyer in the event of defect to a specified time period, see U.C.C. § 2-719(I)(a); see
also, e.g., supra note 4 (faucet warranty limited to replacement), it may consider a failure-torepair rule an acceptable exchange. Finally, a seller may prefer in some cases to avoid a finding
of breach at delivery. If, for instance, a repair provision is found not to be exclusive, see, e.g.,
U.C.C. § 2-719(I)(b), (3) (insufficiently "express" or "unconscionable"), the seller may be liable
for incidental and consequential damages from the date of delivery. A failure-to-repair rule would
protect the seller from liability for damages occurring between the delivery date and the date
of failure to repair.

SPRING

1984]

Written Warranties

741

the differences between repair warranties and no-defects warranties
and satisfies the need for uniform treatment 122 in this unsettled area.

-Carey A. De Witt

122.

See U.C.C. § 2-725, Official Comment (purposes).

